By Kathy Zegarra (Latinoamerica21)
HAVANA TIMES — On February 17, Peru was once again left without a president. What in any democracy would constitute an exceptional crisis has, in the Peruvian case, become a recurring episode. Since 2016, no president has managed to complete their term. Instability is no longer an accident of the political system — it is its dominant trait.
Jose Jeri, who had been president of the Congressional Board until Boluarte was replaced, assumed the presidency in accordance with the constitutional order for a period of 130 days. Jeri had entered Congress as an alternate member following the disqualification of Martin Vizcarra. During his brief administration, he tried to project an image of firm leadership, visiting penitentiaries and using rhetoric centered on order and security. However, his popularity eroded quickly.
Pollster Ipsos recorded a 60% disapproval rating, in a context marked by public controversies such as meetings with Chinese businessmen, rape allegations, and a deterioration in public-security indicators. Although the reasons put forward by congress members for his removal were linked to these episodes, his ouster forms part of a political strategy by parties looking ahead to the upcoming elections. Following his departure, Jose Maria Balcazar, an 83-year-old leftist congressman sadly known for his support of child marriage, has become Peru’s new interim president.
One after another
The last head of state to complete his term was Ollanta Humala (2011–2016). From that point on, succession accelerated. Pedro Pablo Kuczynski resigned after just over a year and a half in office, harassed by a Congress largely controlled by Fujimorismo. His vice president, Martin Vizcarra, who assumed office after the resignation, was removed through the mechanism of “presidential vacancy.” Manuel Merino, then president of Congress, assumed the post according to constitutional order but resigned five days later after intense social protests in which two young men died. Francisco Sagasti completed the transition until the 2021 elections. Pedro Castillo, elected that year, was removed after attempting to dissolve Congress. His vice president, Dina Boluarte, assumed the presidency and, after weak pacts with legislators, was also vacated from office.
Beyond the names and the number of days each remained in power, what matters is that Peru faces institutional fragility that allows for the frequent removal of the head of state. The Peruvian Constitution includes the figure of “vacancy for permanent moral incapacity,” which empowers Congress to remove the president with a two-thirds vote (a simple majority in the case of censure of the president of the Congressional Board).
It is an exceptional mechanism, designed for extreme situations; however, in practice it has become a tool of political pressure. The expression “permanent moral incapacity” is sufficiently ambiguous to allow diverse interpretations. In recent years, it has been invoked for various reasons, from corruption accusations to political disputes, without a clearly delimited legal standard.
This instability has concrete consequences. Public policies require continuity, planning, and inter-institutional coordination. When governments succeed with each other rapidly, ministerial teams change, priorities are redefined, and structural reforms lose momentum. Complex problems such as public insecurity, economic informality, or the precariousness of public services can hardly be addressed effectively in an environment where political survival is the immediate objective.
On the other hand, it is important to note that there was no constitutional reform formally altering the balance of powers after 2016. What changed was the way political actors chose to use the available instruments. Vacancy shifted from being an extraordinary recourse to becoming a constant threat against presidents without a majority in the legislature. In this context, the stability of the Executive depends less on legal criteria than on legislative arithmetic. Added to this is the fact that, following the dissolution of Congress during Martín Vizcarra’s government, the Legislative branch has sought to strengthen its powers, limiting, for example, the possibility that the Senate could be dissolved.
What the country really needs
A far-reaching political reform is therefore indispensable. Strengthening the system of government and the party system is a necessary condition to reduce fragmentation and permanent confrontation. However, changing the rules is not enough. Recent experience shows that a genuine commitment by political elites to democratic stability is essential. In 2018, then-president Martin Vizcarra promoted a package of reforms submitted to referendum. Although it included citizen participation, part of its content was diluted in the subsequent legislative process and failed to generate the expected structural changes.
In the coming months, Peru will return to the polls to elect a president and vice presidents, as well as members of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Given the institutional weakness that characterizes the country, an inevitable question arises: does it matter who occupies the presidency if the rules of the game allow their mandate to be interrupted with relative ease?
The context suggests that the system’s stability depends not only on the presidential figure but on the design and functioning of the institutional framework as a whole. Without adjustments to that framework, the risk that history will repeat itself will remain present.
First published in Spanish by Lationamerica21 and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.
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